Are small investors naive about incentives?

被引:292
作者
Malmendier, Ulrike
Shanthikumar, Devin
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA
关键词
stock recommendations; Trade reaction; individual and institutional investors; conflicts of interest; behavioral finance;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.02.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Security analysts tend to bias stock recommendations upward, particularly if they are affiliated with the underwriter. We analyze how investors account for such distortions. Using the NYSE Trades and Quotations database, we find that large traders adjust their trading response downward. While they exert buy pressure following strong buy recommendations, they display no reaction to buy recommendations and selling pressure following hold recommendations. This "discounting" is even more pronounced when the analyst is affiliated with the underwriter. Small traders, instead, follow recommendations literally. They exert positive pressure following both buy and strong buy recommendations and zero pressure following hold recommendations. We discuss possible explanations for the differences in trading response, including information costs and investor naivete. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:457 / 489
页数:33
相关论文
共 41 条