The debt hangover Renegotiation with noncontractible investment

被引：6

作者：

Bhattacharya, S

Faure-Grimaud, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] LSE, Interdisciplinary Inst Management, Dept Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England

[2] LSE, Interdisciplinary Inst Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, London WC2A 2AE, England

[3] LSE, Interdisciplinary Inst Management, FMG, London WC2A 2AE, England

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 70卷 / 03期

关键词：

debt overhang; nonverifiable investments;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00376-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a levered company to undertake noncontractible investments. This noncontrability is shown to seriously impede the efficiency of any renegotiation process in the debt overhang problems. Conditions for obtaining a fully efficient level of investment choice are derived. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V, All rights reserved.

引用

页码：413 / 419

页数：7