Sabotage in promotion tournaments

被引:115
作者
Chen, KP [1 ]
机构
[1] Acad Sinica, Taipei 115, Taiwan
[2] Natl Taiwan Univ, Taipei 10764, Taiwan
关键词
D O I
10.1093/jleo/19.1.119
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article studies the nature, determinants, and impact of "negative" activities in organizations. In competing for promotion, the members in organizations can work not only to enhance their own performances, but also to "sabotage" their opponent's performances. It is worthwhile for them to engage in negative activities because promotion is generally based on relative, rather than absolute, performance, and its nature is winner take all. I find that abler members are subject to more attacks. Consequently, not only is there a double inefficiency in effort, but also members of the highest caliber might not have the best chance of being promoted. Finally, I discuss several institutional designs that might help to reduce the influence of negative activities.
引用
收藏
页码:119 / 140
页数:22
相关论文
共 27 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], RIVALRY BUSINESS SCI
[2]   THE INTERNAL ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM - EVIDENCE FROM PERSONNEL DATA [J].
BAKER, G ;
GIBBS, M ;
HOLMSTROM, B .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04) :881-919
[3]   THE WAGE POLICY OF A FIRM [J].
BAKER, G ;
GIBBS, M ;
HOLMSTROM, B .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (04) :921-955
[4]  
BRUCK C, 1992, NEW YORKER 0706, P34
[5]   Optimal incentives for teams [J].
Che, YK ;
Yoo, SW .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (03) :525-541
[6]  
CHEN KP, 2002, 17 ANN EUR EC ASS C
[7]   Incentives for helping on the job: Theory and evidence [J].
Drago, R ;
Garvey, GT .
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1998, 16 (01) :1-25
[8]  
Frank RobertH., 1995, WINNER TAKE ALL SOC
[9]   A COMPARISON OF TOURNAMENTS AND CONTRACTS [J].
GREEN, JR ;
STOKEY, NL .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1983, 91 (03) :349-364
[10]   A spatial theory of positive and negative campaigning [J].
Harrington, JE ;
Hess, GD .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1996, 17 (02) :209-229