Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment

被引:9
作者
Casari, Marco [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
关键词
INSTITUTIONS; COOPERATION; COMMUNITY;
D O I
10.1017/S0140525X11001191
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The claims about (1) the lack of empirical support for a model of strong reciprocation and (2) the irrelevant empirical role of costly punishment to support cooperation in the field need qualifications. The interpretation of field evidence is not straightforward, and other-regarding preferences are also likely to play a role in the field.
引用
收藏
页码:21 / 22
页数:3
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