Appropriability and commercialization: Evidence from MIT inventions

被引：58

作者：

Dechenaux, Emmanuel ^{[1
]}

Goldfarb, Brent ^{[2
]}

Shane, Scott ^{[3
]}

Thursby, Marie ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Kent State Univ, Dept Econ, Kent, OH 44242 USA

[2] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

[3] Case Western Reserve Univ, Dept Econ, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

[4] Georgia Inst Technol, Coll Management, Atlanta, GA 30308 USA

[5] NBER, Atlanta, GA 30308 USA

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2008年 / 54卷 / 05期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

competing risks; innovation; optimal stopping problem; patent scope; lead time; learning; university licensing; termination;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.1070.0780

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

The effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied, but there has been little analysis of the effect of appropriability on the commercialization of existing inventions. Exploiting a database of 805 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions licensed from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) between 1980 and 1996, we explore the influence of several appropriability mechanisms on the commercialization and termination of projects to develop products based on university inventions. Our central hypothesis is that the relationship between a licensee's decision to either terminate or commercialize the invention is driven by the current market value of the invention, as well as the option value of delaying its commercialization. We use a competing risks framework that allows for nonparametric heterogeneity and correlated risks. We find that better appropriability in the sense of more effective patent strength and secrecy has a strong negative effect on the hazard of license termination. The effectiveness of learning has a strong positive effect on the hazard of technology commercialization, while lead time has a negative effect.

引用

页码：893 / 906

页数：14

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