Theories of strategic nonmarket participation: Majority-rule and executive institutions

被引：20

作者：

Baron, DP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2001年 / 10卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00047.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper presents theories of strategic nonmarket participation in majority-rule and executive institutions and develops from those theories a set of principles for nonmarket strategy. The theories are based on models of vote recruitment in client and interest-group politics and on models of common agency. The basic strategies developed are majority building, vote recruitment, agenda setting, rent-chain mobilization, majority protection,, and competitive agenda setting and vote recruitment.

引用

页码：47 / 89

页数：43

共 32 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1999, BUS POLIT

[2]

[Anonymous], PIVOTAL POLITICS

[3]

BANKS J, 1999, BUYING MINIMAL MAJOR

[4]

Baron D., 1999, BUSINESS POLITICS, V1, P7

[5]

Baron David P., 2000, BUSINESS ITS ENV

[6] INTEGRATED STRATEGY - MARKET AND NONMARKET COMPONENTS [J].

BARON, DP .

CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 1995, 37 (02) :47-65

[7]

Baron DP, 1997, J ECON MANAGE STRAT, V6, P291, DOI 10.1162/105864097567110

[8]

BARON DP, 1995, SLOAN MANAGE REV, V37, P73

[9]

BARON DP, 2000, COMPETITIVE LOBBYING

[10] THE SOLUTION TO THE TULLOCK RENT-SEEKING GAME WHEN R-GREATER-THAN-2 - MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA AND MEAN DISSIPATION RATES [J].

BAYE, MR ;

KOVENOCK, D ;

DEVRIES, CG .

PUBLIC CHOICE, 1994, 81 (3-4) :363-380

← 1 2 3 4 →