Endogenous mergers and size asymmetry of merger participants

被引：35

作者：

Barros, PP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Econ, P-1070 Lisboa, Portugal

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1998年 / 60卷 / 01期

关键词：

endogenous mergers; size assymmetry; merger participants;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00082-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This note presents a simple model highlighting the basic economic intuition about the relationship between initial market concentration and size asymmetry of merger participants. Merger participants are endogenously determined. The main result shows that a negative relation should be expected. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

引用

页码：113 / 119

页数：7

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