Marketable permits, market power, and cheating

被引：72

作者：

vanEgteren, H

Weber, M

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, 8-14 Tory Building, University of Alberta, Edmonton

来源：

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT | 1996年 / 30卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeem.1996.0011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we present a model of a noncompliant firm operating in a marketable pollution permit market. In the main result of the paper, we show how compliance is related to the initial distribution of permits. A firm with market power will cheat less the larger its endowment of permits is from a fixed stock of permits. The competitive fringe, however, will cheat more as its endowment of permits is reduced, generating an ambiguous global impact on cheating. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：161 / 173

页数：13

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