Institutional ownership stability and the cost of debt

被引：148

作者：

Elyasiani, Elyas ^{[1
]}

Jia, Jingyi ^{[2
]}

Mao, Connie X. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Temple Univ, Dept Finance, Fox Sch Business & Management, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA

[2] So Illinois Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Sch Business, Edwardsville, IL 62026 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS | 2010年 / 13卷 / 04期

关键词：

Institutional ownership stability; Corporate governance; Agency problems; Cost of debt; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS; AGENCY COSTS; CASH FLOW; INVESTMENT; INVESTORS; BEHAVIOR; DETERMINANTS; INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.finmar.2010.05.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study documents that the stability of institutional ownership plays an important role in determining the cost of debt. After controlling for other determinants of the cost of debt, and correcting for the endogeneity of institutional ownership stability, three major results are uncovered. First, there is a robust negative relationship between the cost of debt and institutional ownership stability. Second, institutional ownership stability plays a bigger role in determining the cost of debt, than the institutional ownership level commonly used in the literature. Third, institutional ownership stability affects the cost of debt to a greater extent for firms that are subject to more severe information asymmetry and greater agency costs of debt. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：475 / 500

页数：26

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