Environmental regulation with technology adoption, learning and strategic behavior

被引:65
作者
Tarui, N
Polasky, S
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Dept Appl Econ, St Paul, MN 55108 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Earth Inst, New York, NY 10025 USA
关键词
environmental regulation; emissions taxes and standards; rules versus discretion; technology adoption;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeem.2005.01.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze a model of environmental regulation with learning about environmental damages and endogenous choice of emissions abatement technology by a polluting firm. We compare environmental policy under discretion, in which policy is updated upon learning new information, versus under rules, in which policy is not updated. When investment in abatement technology is made prior to the resolution of uncertainty, neither discretion nor rules with either taxes or standards achieve an efficient solution except in special cases. When there is little uncertainty, rules are superior to discretion because discretionary policy gives the firm an incentive to distort investment in order to influence future regulation. However, when uncertainty is large, discretion is superior to rules because it allows regulation to incorporate new information. Taxes are superior to standards under discretion regardless of the relative slopes of marginal costs and marginal damages for the case of quadratic abatement costs and damages. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:447 / 467
页数:21
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