Multihoming in Two-Sided Markets: An Empirical Inquiry in the Video Game Console Industry

被引:121
作者
Landsman, Vardit [1 ,2 ]
Stremersch, Stefan [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Leon Recanati Grad Sch Business Adm, Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Erasmus Univ, Erasmus Sch Econ, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
[3] Univ Navarra, IESE Business Sch, E-31080 Pamplona, Spain
关键词
two-sided markets; multihoming; entertainment markets; indirect network effects; video game industry; NETWORK EXTERNALITIES; COMPETITION; SOFTWARE; RETURNS; SYSTEMS; SALES; MODEL; US;
D O I
10.1509/jm.09.0199
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Two-sided markets are composed of platform owners and two distinct user networks that either buy or sell applications for the platform. The authors focus on multihoming-the choice of an agent in a user network to use more than one platform. In the context of the video game console industry, they examine the conditions affecting seller-level multihoming decisions on a given platform. Furthermore, they investigate how platform-level multihoming of applications affects the sales of the platform. The authors show that increased platform-level multihoming of applications hurts platform sales, a finding consistent with literature on brand differentiation, but they also show that this effect vanishes as platforms mature or gain market share. The authors find that platform-level multihoming of applications affects platform sales more strongly than the number of applications. Furthermore, among mature platforms, an increasing market share leads to more seller-level multihoming, while among nascent platforms, seller-level multihoming decreases as platform market share increases. These findings prompt scholars to look beyond network size in analyzing two-sided markets and provide guidance to both (application) sellers and platform owners.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 54
页数:16
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