The Role of Theory in Field Experiments

被引:45
作者
Card, David [1 ,2 ]
DellaVigna, Stefano [1 ]
Malmendier, Ulrike [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Labor Studies Program, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
We classify all published field experiments in five top economics journals from 1975 to 2010 according to how closely the experimental design and analysis are linked to economic theory. We find that the vast majority of field experiments (68 percent) are Descriptive studies that lack any explicit model; 18 percent are Single Model studies that test a single model-based hypothesis; 6 percent are Competing Models studies that test competing model-based hypotheses; and 8 percent are Parameter Estimation studies that estimate structural parameters in a completely specified model. We also classify laboratory experiments published in these journals over the same period and find that economic theory has played a more central role in the laboratory than in the field. Finally; we discuss in detail three sets of field experiments-on gift exchange; on charitable giving; and on negative income tax-that illustrate both the benefits and the potential costs of a tighter link between experimental design and theoretical underpinnings; GIFT EXCHANGE; SOCIAL EXPERIMENT; MARKET; RECIPROCITY; INCENTIVES; ASSIGNMENT; ECONOMICS; FAIRNESS; PROGRAMS; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1257/jep.25.3.39
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 62
页数:24
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