How well do institutional theories explain firms perceptions of property rights?

被引:50
作者
Ayyagari, Meghana [3 ]
Demirguec-Kunt, Asli [2 ]
Maksimovic, Vojislav [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA
[3] George Washington Univ, Washington, DC 20052 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhl032
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine how well several institutional- and firm-level factors explain firms' perceptions of property rights protection. The institutional theories we investigate account for approximately 50% of the country-level variation, indicating that current research addresses first-order factors. Firm-level characteristics, such as legal organization and ownership structure, are comparable with institutional factors in explaining variations in property rights protection. A country's legal origin predicts property rights variation better than its religion, ethnic fractionalization, or natural endowments. However, these results are driven by the inclusion of former Socialist economies in the sample. When we exclude the former Socialist economies, legal origin explains considerably less than ethnic fractionalization does.
引用
收藏
页码:1833 / 1871
页数:39
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