DOES TERRORISM REALLY WORK? EVOLUTION IN THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM SINCE 9/11

被引:27
作者
Abrahms, Max
机构
关键词
ESCALATION; CRITIQUE; RELIGION; ATTACKS;
D O I
10.1080/10242694.2011.635954
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
020101 [政治经济学];
摘要
The basic narrative of bargaining theory predicts that, all else equal, anarchy favors concessions to challengers who demonstrate the will and ability to escalate against defenders. For this reason, post-9/11 political science research explained terrorism as rational strategic behavior for non-state challengers to induce government compliance given their constraints. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has consistently found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to achieve their demands. In fact, escalating to terrorism or with terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels, depriving the non-state challengers of their given preferences. These empirical findings across disciplines, methodologies, as well as salient global events raise important research questions, with implications for counterterrorism strategy.
引用
收藏
页码:583 / 594
页数:12
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