Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms

被引:470
作者
Bharath, Sreedhar T. [1 ]
Dahiya, Sandeep [2 ]
Saunders, Anthony [3 ]
Srinivasan, Anand [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Dept Finance, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[3] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10003 USA
[4] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Finance, NUS Business Sch, Singapore, Singapore
[5] Natl Univ Singapore, Risk Management Inst, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
DEBT MATURITY; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; RELATIONSHIP BANKING; CREDIT; DETERMINANTS; REPUTATION; REGRESSION; DISTRESS; BENEFITS;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhp064
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that repeated borrowing from the same lender translates into a 10-17 bps lowering of loan spreads and that relationships are especially valuable when borrower transparency is low. These results hold using multiple approaches (propensity score matching, instrumental variables, and treatment effects model) that control for the endogeneity of relationships. We also provide a demarcation line between relationship and transactional lending. Spreads charged for relationship loans and nonrelationship loans are statistically identical if the borrower is in the largest 30% by asset size; has public rated debt; or is part of the S&P 500 index. Past relationships reduce collateral requirements and are also associated with obtaining larger loans. Our results imply that, even for firms that have multiple sources of outside financing, borrowing from a prior lender obtains better loan terms. (JEL D82, G30, G20, G21, G24, L14, N20)
引用
收藏
页码:1141 / 1203
页数:63
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