Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies

被引:60
作者
Samuelson, L [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
analogies; bargaining; bounded rationality; complexity; evolution;
D O I
10.1006/jeth.2000.2754
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This payer studies decision makers characterized by a stock of models, or analogies, who respond to strategic interactions by applying what appear to be the most suitable models: balancing the gains from more sophisticated decisionmaking against the cost of placing heavier demands on scarce reasoning resources. Equilibrium models will be finely tuned to interactions, leading to seemingly "rational" behavior, when the interactions are sufficiently important and sufficiently distinct that a more generic model entails a prohibitive payoff reduction. Interactions that are infrequently encountered. relatively unimportant. or similar to other interactions may trigger seemingly inappropriate analogies. leading to behavioral anomalies. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:320 / 366
页数:47
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