Bequests as signals: An explanation for the equal division puzzle

被引:69
作者
Bernheim, BD [1 ]
Severinov, S
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[3] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/375383
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
In the United States, more than two-thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children. In contrast, gifts given before death are usually unequal. These findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers. In this paper, we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent's altruistic preferences. The theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture, which prevails in other societies.
引用
收藏
页码:733 / 764
页数:32
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