Defending the Right To Do Wrong

被引:35
作者
Herstein, Ori J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Sch Law, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
关键词
Supra Note; Moral Character; Personal Autonomy; Personal Integrity; Moral Person;
D O I
10.1007/s10982-011-9126-x
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder's wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one's violation of one's own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals that none refute the coherence of the concept of a 'moral right to do moral wrong'. At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, actual.
引用
收藏
页码:343 / 365
页数:23
相关论文
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