Learning in games

被引：306

作者：

Fudenberg, D ^{[1
]}

Levine, D

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1998年 / 42卷 / 3-5期

关键词：

learning in games; fictitious play; consistency; experiments; game theory;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00011-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This essay discusses some recent work on 'learning in games'. We explore nonequilibrium theories in which equilibrium emerges as the long-run outcome of a dynamic process of adjustment or learning. We focus on individual level models, and more specifically on variants of 'fictitious play' in two-player games. We discuss both the theoretical properties of the models and their relationship to regularities observed in game theory experiments. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：631 / 639

页数：9

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