Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games

[1] Communication, computability, and common interest games [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1999, 27 (01) : 1 - 37

[2] Anderson S.P., 1992, DISCRETE CHOICE THEO

[3] [Anonymous], ECONOMETRICA, DOI DOI 10.2307/2951778

[4] Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 74 (02) : 235 - 265

[5] Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 77 (01) : 1 - 14

[6] Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1999, 67 (04) : 827 - 874

[7] CAMERER C, 2000, SOPHISTICATED EWA LE

[8] GLOBAL GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1993, 61 (05) : 989 - 1018

[9] Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1997, 19 (01) : 46 - 76

[10] CLARK K, 1996, ARE NASH EQUILIBRIA

[1] Communication, computability, and common interest games [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1999, 27 (01) : 1 - 37

[2] Anderson S.P., 1992, DISCRETE CHOICE THEO

[3] [Anonymous], ECONOMETRICA, DOI DOI 10.2307/2951778

[4] Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 74 (02) : 235 - 265

[5] Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 77 (01) : 1 - 14

[6] Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1999, 67 (04) : 827 - 874

[7] CAMERER C, 2000, SOPHISTICATED EWA LE

[8] GLOBAL GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1993, 61 (05) : 989 - 1018

[9] Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1997, 19 (01) : 46 - 76

[10] CLARK K, 1996, ARE NASH EQUILIBRIA