Trends in corporate governance

被引:212
作者
Hermalin, BE [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00801.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The popular press and scholarly studies have noted a number of trends in corporate governance. This article addresses, from a theoretical perspective, whether these trends are linked. And, if so, how ? The article finds that a trend toward greater board diligence will lead, sometimes through subtle or indirect mechanisms, to trends toward more external candidates becoming CEO, shorter tenures for CEOs, more effort/less perquisite consumption by CEOs (even though such behavior is not directly monitored), and greater CEO compensation. An additional prediction is that, under plausible conditions, externally hired CEOs should have shorter tenures, on average, than internally hired CEOs.
引用
收藏
页码:2351 / 2384
页数:34
相关论文
共 24 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], FLATTENING FIRM EVID
[2]  
Baskin JonathanBarron Paul J. Miranti., 1997, A History of Corporate Finance
[3]   Executive compensation as an agency problem [J].
Bebchuk, LA ;
Fried, JA .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2003, 17 (03) :71-92
[4]   The design of internal control and capital structure [J].
Berkovitch, E ;
Israel, R .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1996, 9 (01) :209-240
[5]   Outside directors and CEO selection [J].
Borokhovich, KA ;
Parrino, R ;
Trapani, T .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1996, 31 (03) :337-355
[6]  
Dahya J, 2001, OUTSIDE DIRECTORS CO
[7]  
DeGroot M., 1970, OPTIMAL STAT DECISIO
[8]   Governance, performance objectives and organizational form: evidence from hospitals [J].
Eldenburg, L ;
Hermalin, BE ;
Weisbach, MS ;
Wosinska, M .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2004, 10 (04) :527-548
[9]   AGENCY PROBLEMS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM [J].
FAMA, EF .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (02) :288-307
[10]   Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors [J].
Gillan, SL ;
Starks, LT .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 57 (02) :275-305