The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games

被引：170

作者：

Baye, MR

Hoppe, HC

机构：

[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, Chair Econ Theory 2, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

[2] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Dept Business Econ, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2003年 / 44卷 / 02期

关键词：

contest; rent seeking; innovation tournament; R&D; patents;

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00027-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We establish the strategic equivalence of a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games. The results allow us to disentangle negative and positive externalities, and to apply theorems and results intended for rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa. We conclude with several examples that highlight the practical utility of our results. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：217 / 226

页数：10

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