Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks

被引:1302
作者
Chan, HW [1 ]
Perrig, A [1 ]
Song, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
来源
2003 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, PROCEEDINGS | 2003年
关键词
D O I
10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199337
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because. asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using. the framework of pre-distributing a random set of keys to each node. First, in the q-composite keys scheme-we trade off the unlikeliness of a large-scale network attack in order to significantly strengthen random key predistribution's strength against smaller-scale attacks. Second, in the multipath-reinforcement scheme, we show how to strengthen the security between any two nodes by leveraging the security of other links. Finally, we present the random-pairwise keys scheme, which perfectly preserves the secrecy of the rest of the network when any node is captured, and also enables node-to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation.
引用
收藏
页码:197 / 213
页数:17
相关论文
共 25 条
  • [1] AGARWAL A, 1988, P 15 INT S COMP ARCH, P280
  • [2] ANDERSON R, 2001, UNPUB KEY INFECT SMA
  • [3] BALFANZ D, 2002, P IEEE S RES SEC PRI, P241
  • [4] SPECIAL ISSUE PARALLEL METHODS FOR ORDINARY DIFFERENTIAL-EQUATIONS - INTRODUCTION
    BELLEN, A
    ZENNARO, M
    [J]. APPLIED NUMERICAL MATHEMATICS, 1993, 11 (1-3) : 1 - 2
  • [5] Making home automation communications secure
    Bergstrom, P
    Driscoll, K
    Kimball, J
    [J]. COMPUTER, 2001, 34 (10) : 50 - +
  • [6] BOYD C, 1998, AUSTR C INF SEC PRIV, P344
  • [7] BROWN M, 2000, 9 USENIX SEC S AUG
  • [8] CARMAN DW, 2000, 00010 NAI LAB TECHN
  • [9] NEW DIRECTIONS IN CRYPTOGRAPHY
    DIFFIE, W
    HELLMAN, ME
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, 1976, 22 (06) : 644 - 654
  • [10] Eschenauer L., 2002, Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, P41, DOI [10.1145/586110.586117, DOI 10.1145/586110.586117]