Individual differences in rational thought

被引:490
作者
Stanovich, KE
West, RF
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, Dept Human Dev & Appl Psychol, Ontario Inst Studies Educ, Toronto, ON M5S 1V6, Canada
[2] James Madison Univ, Dept Psychol, Harrisonburg, VA 22807 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1037/0096-3445.127.2.161
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and the false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic-level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict individual differences in performance on these tasks.
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页码:161 / 188
页数:28
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