A model of institutional formation within a rent seeking environment

被引：4

作者：

Sylwester, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] So Illinois Univ, Dept Econ, Carbondale, IL 62901 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2001年 / 44卷 / 02期

关键词：

rent seeking; institutions; property rights;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00158-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper. presents a game theoretic model in which some fraction of output is appropriated from entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are able to form a league to prevent this appropriation, but this might not be individually rational because of either the free rider problem or coordination failure. The model also shows that poorer countries are less able to form this league and so might not be able to develop institutions establishing property rights. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: O10; H41.

引用

页码：169 / 176

页数：8

共 22 条

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