Expanding kidney paired donation through participation by compatible pairs

被引:119
作者
Gentry, S. E.
Segev, D. L. [1 ]
Simmerling, M.
Montgomery, R. A.
机构
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Sch Med, Dept Surg, Baltimore, MD 21205 USA
[2] US Naval Aad, Dept Math, Annapolis, MD USA
[3] Univ Chicago, MacLean Ctr Clin Med Ethics, Dept Surg, Chicago, IL USA
关键词
altruistically unbalanced exchange; blood type incompatibility; donor exchange; incompatible donors; live donor kidney transplantation; paired kidney exchange;
D O I
10.1111/j.1600-6143.2007.01935.x
中图分类号
R61 [外科手术学];
学科分类号
摘要
In kidney paired donation (KPD), incompatible pairs exchange kidneys so that each recipient receives a compatible organ. This modality is underutilized partly because of the difficulty of finding a suitable match among incompatible pairs. Alternatively, recipients with compatible donors might enter KPD arrangements in order to be matched with a donor predicted to give greater allograft durability or for other altruistic reasons. Using simulated donors and recipients, we investigated the impact of allowing recipients and their compatible donors to participate in KPD. For KPD programs of any size, the participation of compatible donor/recipient pairs nearly doubled the match rate for incompatible pairs (28.2% to 64.5% for single-center program, 37.4% to 75.4% for national program). Legal, logistical, and governmental controversies have hampered the expansion of KPD in the United States by delaying the creation of a national program. The inclusion of compatible pairs into small single-center pools could achieve match rates that would surpass that which could be realized by a national list made up of only incompatible pairs. This new paradigm of KPD can immediately be instituted at the single-center level, while the greatest gains will be achieved by incorporating compatible pairs into a national program.
引用
收藏
页码:2361 / 2370
页数:10
相关论文
共 27 条
[1]   The Dutch national living donor kidney exchange program [J].
de Klerk, M ;
Keizer, KM ;
Claas, FHJ ;
Witvliet, M ;
Haase-Kromwijk, BJJM ;
Weimar, W .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION, 2005, 5 (09) :2302-2305
[2]   MAXIMUM MATCHING AND A POLYHEDRON WITH O'1-VERTICES [J].
EDMONDS, J .
JOURNAL OF RESEARCH OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SECTION B-MATHEMATICS AND MATHEMATICAL, 1965, B 69 (1-2) :125-+
[3]   AN O(EVLOGV) ALGORITHM FOR FINDING A MAXIMAL WEIGHTED MATCHING IN GENERAL GRAPHS [J].
GALIL, Z ;
MICALI, S ;
GABOW, H .
SIAM JOURNAL ON COMPUTING, 1986, 15 (01) :120-130
[4]   A comparison of populations served by kidney paired donation and list paired donation [J].
Gentry, SE ;
Segev, DL ;
Montgomery, RA .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION, 2005, 5 (08) :1914-1921
[5]  
Gjertson David W, 2004, Clin Transpl, P303
[6]   A computer match program for paired and unconventional kidney exchanges [J].
Kaplan, I ;
Houp, JA ;
Leffell, MS ;
Hart, JM ;
Zachary, AA .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION, 2005, 5 (09) :2306-2308
[7]   One donor, two transplants: willingness to participate in altruistically unbalanced exchange donation [J].
Kranenburg, Leonieke W. ;
Zuidema, Willij ;
Weimar, Willem ;
Passchier, Jan ;
Hilhorst, Medard ;
de Klerk, Marry ;
IJzermans, Jan N. M. ;
Busschbach, Jan J. V. .
TRANSPLANT INTERNATIONAL, 2006, 19 (12) :995-999
[8]   US surgeons do first "triple-swap" kidney transplantation [J].
McLellan, F .
LANCET, 2003, 362 (9382) :456-456
[9]  
MEHLHORN K, 2006, LEDA 5 2 SAARBRUECKE
[10]   Clinical results from transplanting incompatible live kidney donor/recipient pairs using kidney paired donation [J].
Montgomery, RA ;
Zachary, AA ;
Ratner, LE ;
Segev, DL ;
Hiller, JM ;
Houp, J ;
Cooper, M ;
Kavoussi, L ;
Jarrett, T ;
Burdick, J ;
Maley, WR ;
Melancon, JK ;
Kozlowski, T ;
Simpkins, CE ;
Phillips, M ;
Desai, A ;
Collins, V ;
Reeb, B ;
Kraus, E ;
Rabb, H ;
Leffell, MS ;
Warren, DS .
JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 2005, 294 (13) :1655-1663