Homevoters, municipal corporate governance, and the benefit view of the property tax

被引:77
作者
Fischel, WA [1 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
D O I
10.17310/ntj.2001.1.08
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Tiebout's "vote with your feet" model dispensed with political behavior in local government. The present article offers a political model borrowed from corporate finance. Local government are viewed as municipal corporations whose shareholders are homeowners and whose collective property rights are protected hy zoning. Homeowners are motivated to control local government because ifs services and taxes affect the value of their largest asset, their homes. The homevoter model implies that local property taxes are benefit taxes, that locally-funded schools are more efficient than st ate;funded systems, and that home-conscious "NIMBYs" fore-stall an environmentally destructive "race to the bottom" in tax-base competition.
引用
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页码:157 / 173
页数:17
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