An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR

被引：42

作者：

Chevalier, Y ^{[1
]}

Küsters, R ^{[1
]}

Rusinowitch, M ^{[1
]}

Turuani, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Henri Poincare, INRIA, LORIA, F-54506 Vandoeuvre Les Nancy, France

来源：

18TH ANNUAL IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON LOGIC IN COMPUTER SCIENCE, PROCEEDINGS | 2003年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/LICS.2003.1210066

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended with so-called oracle rules, i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. As an instance of this general framework, we obtain that protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruder that can exploit the properties of the XOR operator This operator is frequently used in cryptographic protocols but cannot be handled in most protocol models. An immediate consequence of our proof is that checking whether a message can be derived by an intruder (using XOR) is in P We also apply our framework to an intruder that exploits properties of certain encryption modes such as cipher block chaining (CBC).

引用

页码：261 / 270

页数：10