Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games

被引:97
作者
Mookherjee, D [1 ]
Sopher, B [1 ]
机构
[1] INDIAN STAT INST,NEW DELHI 110016,INDIA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1997.0540
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Subjects played strategically similar 4 x 4 and 6 x 6 constant sum games under varying payoff scales. Substantial divergences from equilibrium predictions were exhibited. The dynamic pattern of play is best explained by a stimulus learning model whereby players allocate weight to different actions according to their relative (time average) payoff experience in past plays. The results do not provide much support for the hypothesis that players select best responses to beliefs about opponent play based on observed choice frequencies in past plays, modified by random errors or preference shocks. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 132
页数:36
相关论文
共 35 条
[1]  
AMEMIYA T, 1981, J ECON LIT, V19, P483
[2]   AN EXPERIMENTAL-ANALYSIS OF NASH REFINEMENTS IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].
BANKS, J ;
CAMERER, C ;
PORTER, D .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1994, 6 (01) :1-31
[3]  
BENDOR J, 1993, ASPIRATIONS ADAPTIVE
[4]   FICTITIOUS PLAY - A STATISTICAL STUDY OF MULTIPLE ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS [J].
BOYLAN, RT ;
ELGAMAL, MA .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1993, 5 (02) :205-222
[5]   ADJUSTMENT PATTERNS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN EXPERIMENTAL SIGNALING GAMES [J].
BRANDTS, J ;
HOLT, CA .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1993, 22 (03) :279-302
[6]   TESTING THE MINIMAX HYPOTHESIS - A REEXAMINATION OF ONEILL GAME EXPERIMENT [J].
BROWN, JN ;
ROSENTHAL, RW .
ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (05) :1065-1081
[7]   TOURNAMENTS AND PIECE RATES - AN EXPERIMENTAL-STUDY [J].
BULL, C ;
SCHOTTER, A ;
WEIGELT, K .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1987, 95 (01) :1-33
[8]  
BUSH RR, 1955, STOCHASTIC MODELS LE
[9]  
COOPER RW, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P218
[10]  
COX J, 1990, UNPUB REWARD SALIENC