Myths and meanings of voting power - Comments on a symposium

被引:21
作者
Felsenthal, DS [1 ]
Machover, M
机构
[1] Univ Haifa, Dept Polit Sci, IL-31905 Haifa, Israel
[2] Kings Coll London, Dept Philosophy, London WC2 2LS, England
关键词
actual and a priori voting power; European Union; I-power; P-power; strategic measures;
D O I
10.1177/0951692801013001004
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
These are comments on the Symposium 'Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. We point out several common inter-connected confusions and errors concerning the meaning of voting power. We stress the vital distinction between two different intuitive notions of voting power. We emphasize the need for a unified approach to the study of a priori and actual voting power. We show that the family of 'strategic' measures proposed by some of the participants in the Symposium are a natural generalization of the Banzhaf measure.
引用
收藏
页码:81 / 97
页数:17
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