A Theory of Military Dictatorships

被引：123

作者：

Acemoglu, Daron ^{[1
]}

Ticchi, Davide ^{[2
]}

Vindigni, Andrea ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] Univ Urbino, Dept Econ & Quantitat Methods, I-61029 Urbino, Italy

[3] Princeton Univ, Dept Polit, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS | 2010年 / 2卷 / 01期

关键词：

DEMOCRACY;

D O I：

10.1257/mac.2.1.1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions necessary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once the transition to democracy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dictatorships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation. (JEL D72, H56)

引用

页码：1 / 42

页数：42

共 44 条

[1] Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective [J].