Going public and the ownership structure of the firm

被引:101
作者
Mello, AS [1 ]
Parsons, JE
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Grad Sch Business, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[2] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London W1X 1LB, England
[3] Charles River Associates, Boston, MA 02116 USA
关键词
sale of shares; heterogeneous investors; ownership structure;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00018-X
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Going public is a complex process with distinct markets for dispersed shares and controlling blocks. It is important to design the sale of new shares with the final ownership structure in mind. An optimal strategy for going public starts with the IPO, which is particularly suited for the sale of dispersed holdings to small and passive investors. The marketing of potentially controlling blocks to active investors should occur subsequently. We develop a framework for evaluating alternative methods of sale and show that discriminating in favor of active investors can raise the market value of the firm for all shareholders. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:79 / 109
页数:31
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