Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems

被引:89
作者
Hausken, Kjell [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Stavanger, Fac Social Sci, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway
关键词
game theory; reliability theory; OR in military; utility theory; Defense; attack; contest success function; series system; parallel system; protection; terrorism; war; conflict;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2007.02.013
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
A system of independent components is defended by a strategic defender and attacked by a strategic attacker. The reliability of each component depends on how strongly it is defended and attacked, and on the intensity of the contest. In a series system, the attacker benefits from a substitution effect since attacker benefits flow from attacking any of the components, while the defender needs to defend all components. Even for a series system, when the attacker is sufficiently disadvantaged with high attack inefficiencies, and the intensity of the contest is sufficiently high, the defender earns maximum utility and the attacker earns zero utility. The results for the defender (attacker) in a parallel system are equivalent to the results for the attacker (defender) in a series system. Hence, the defender benefits from the substitution effect in parallel systems. With budget constraints the ratio of the investments for each component, and the contest success function for each component, are the same as without budget constraints when replacing the system values for the defender and attacker with their respective budget constraints. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:856 / 881
页数:26
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