A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences

被引：264

作者：

Blanco, Mariana ^{[2
]}

Engelmann, Dirk ^{[1
,3
,4
]}

Normann, Hans Theo ^{[5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany

[2] Univ Rosario, Dept Econ, Bogota, Colombia

[3] Univ Copenhagen, Ctr Expt Econ, DK-1168 Copenhagen, Denmark

[4] Acad Sci Czech Republ, Inst Econ, Prague, Czech Republic

[5] Univ Dusseldorf, Duesseldorf Ctr Competit Econ DICE, D-40225 Dusseldorf, Germany

[6] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Bonn, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2011年 / 72卷 / 02期

关键词：

Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Inequality aversion; Other-regarding preferences; INEQUALITY AVERSION; MAXIMIN PREFERENCES; EFFICIENCY; FAIRNESS; RECIPROCITY; MODEL; GAME;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences inequality aversion using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：321 / 338

页数：18

共 49 条

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