A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using experimental data

被引:38
作者
Cheung, YW [1 ]
Friedman, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Econ Board, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA
关键词
belief learning; experimental data; mixed Nash equilibrium; replicator dynamics;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00052-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We compare the explanatory power of two popular adjustment models, replicator dynamics and simple belief learning dynamics. The data, gathered over 18 laboratory sessions each with 8 to 16 profit-motivated players, comprise more than 100 runs (each with 10 or more stages or periods) of single and two population 2x2 bimatrix games with unique interior equilibria. To equalize the number of free parameters we suppress individual player and treatment effects known to be highly significant in the simple belief learning model. Nevertheless the belief learning model narrowly outperforms the replicator model on the single population data and greatly outperforms it on the two population data. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:263 / 280
页数:18
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