The economics of vocation or 'why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse"?

被引：95

作者：

Heyes, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ London Royal Holloway & Bedford New Coll, Dept Econ, Egham TW20 0EX, Surrey, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 24卷 / 03期

关键词：

labor supply; motivation; job satisfaction; vocation; nursing;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Given the longstanding shortage of nurses in many jurisdictions, why could not nursing wages be raised to attract more people into the profession? We tell a story in which the status of nursing as a 'vocation' implies that increasing wages reduces the average quality of applicants attracted. The underlying mechanism accords with the notion that increasing wages might attract the 'wrong sort' of people into the profession and highlights an (in)efficiency wage mechanism, particular to vocations, which makes wages sticky upwards. The analysis has implications for job design in vocation-based sectors such as nursing and teaching. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：561 / 569

页数：9

共 17 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1995, A Dictionary of Contemporary English

[2] JOB-SATISFACTION AND THE GOOD SOLDIER - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFFECT AND EMPLOYEE CITIZENSHIP [J].