Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply

被引：71

作者：

Back, K

Zender, JF

机构：

[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Finance, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

[2] Washington Univ, St Louis, MO USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 73卷 / 01期

关键词：

divisible good auctions; endogenous supply;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00465-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Uniform-price auctions are studied in which the seller may cancel part of the supply after observing the bids. This feature eliminates many of the `collusive seeming' equilibria of the auction. In equilibrium the seller always sells the full quantity. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：29 / 34

页数：6

共 13 条

[1] AUSUBEL LM, 1999, DEMAND REDUCTION INE
[2] AUCTIONS OF DIVISIBLE GOODS - ON THE RATIONALE FOR THE TREASURY EXPERIMENT
BACK, K
ZENDER, JF
[J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1993, 6 (04) : 733 - 764
[3] AUCTIONS WITH ENDOGENOUS QUANTITY
HANSEN, RG
[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 19 (01) : 44 - 58
[4] HELLER D, 1998, AUCTIONS SWISS GOVT
[5] KREMER I, 1998, DIVISIBLE GOOD AUCTI
[6] LENGWILER Y, 1998, MULTIPLE UNIT AUCTIO
[7] MCADAMS D, 2000, COLLUSIVE SEEMING EQ
[8] NYBORG K, 1999, COMPLICITY SHARE AUC
[9] SIMON D, 1992, TREAS EXP SINGL PRIC
[10] Efficiency of large private value auctions
Swinkels, JM
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 2001, 69 (01) : 37 - 68

← 1 2 →