Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?

被引:260
作者
Gibbons, R [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
theory of the firm; vertical integration; transaction costs; rent seeking; property rights;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this essay, I define and compare elemental versions of four theories of the firm. These elemental theories are distilled from important contributions by Hart, Holmstrom, Klein, Williamson, and others. Although these contributions have been widely cited and much discussed, I have found it difficult to understand the commonalities, distinctions, and potential combinations of these seemingly familiar contributions. In this essay, therefore, I attempt to clarify these issues in three steps: I begin with informal summaries of the theories, then turn to simple but formal statements of each elemental theory, and finally nest the four elemental theories in an integrative framework. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:200 / 245
页数:46
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