Quality improvement in competing supply chains

被引：130

作者：

Xie, Gang ^{[1
]}

Wang, Shouyang ^{[1
]}

Lai, K. K. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China

[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Management Sci, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 134卷 / 01期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金; 中国博士后科学基金;

关键词：

Supply chain; Competition; Coordination; Quality improvement; MANAGEMENT; PRICE; PRODUCT; COORDINATION; INCENTIVES; CONTRACTS; DUOPOLY; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.07.007

中图分类号：

T [工业技术];

学科分类号：

08 ;

摘要：

In this study, we consider quality improvement in a given segment of the market, shared by two supplier-manufacturer supply chains which offer a given product at the same price but compete on quality. The mechanism on the selection of supply chain structures and quality improvement strategies of the two supply chains is described. In particular, we analyze three possible structure combinations: two integrated supply chains, two decentralized supply chains, and one integrated and one decentralized supply chains. Between the supply chains, Nash's non-cooperative game is implemented. Numerical experiments illustrate the mechanism and some related issues are discussed. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：262 / 270

页数：9

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