R&D incentives and market structure: Dynamic analysis

被引：31

作者：

Cellini, R ^{[1
]}

Lambertini, L

机构：

[1] Univ Catania, Dept Econ, Catania, Italy

[2] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, Bologna, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS | 2005年 / 126卷 / 01期

关键词：

differential games; optimal control; research and development;

D O I：

10.1007/s10957-005-2659-0

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment increases monotonically with the number of firms. This Arrowian result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic.

引用

页码：85 / 96

页数：12

共 20 条

[1] Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers [J].