Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy

被引：33

作者：

Adams, G ^{[1
]}

Rausser, G ^{[1
]}

Simon, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF BERKELEY,DEPT AGR & RESOURCE ECON,BERKELEY,CA 94720

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1996年 / 30卷 / 01期

关键词：

noncooperative bargaining; negotiations; simulation models; water policy;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00844-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we advance a new framework for noncooperative, multilateral bargaining that can be used to conceptualize negotiation processes. In the proposed game theoretic setting, the outcome of the negotiation process depends crucially on the ''constitutional'' structure of the game: the input each group has in the decision making process, the coalitions of groups that can implement proposals, the scope of the negotiations and, the outcome if the parties fail to reach agreement. Computer simulations allow investigation of the likely outcome of negotiations under various constitutional regimes. Analysis of recent water policy negotiations in California illustrates the capacity of the model.

引用

页码：97 / 111

页数：15