Strategies to reduce contribution evasion in social security financing

被引:53
作者
Bailey, C [1 ]
Turner, J
机构
[1] Int Labour Off, Geneva, Switzerland
[2] AARP, Washington, DC USA
关键词
social security financing; social security reform; social security administration; developing countries worldwide; enforcement of labor laws;
D O I
10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00100-5
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Contribution evasion is a serious problem for social security financing in many countries. A mixture of strategies may be most effective in reducing the underpayment and nonpayment of mandatory social security contributions by employers and workers. Contribution evasion can be reduced by changes in: (a) the incentives inherent in the design of social security systems, (b) employer, worker and governmental attitudes toward compliance, (c) administrative procedures that improve the efficiency of contribution collection by government or reduce the cost to workers and employers of compliance, and (d) macroeconomic policies that maintain low inflation and provide for low unemployment with stable growth. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:385 / 393
页数:9
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