Monotonicity and Implementability

被引：39

作者：

Ashlagi, Itai ^{[1
]}

Braverman, Mark ^{[2
]}

Hassidim, Avinatan ^{[3
]}

Monderer, Dov ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] Microsoft Res, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[3] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[4] Technion Israel Inst Technol, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2010年 / 78卷 / 05期

关键词：

Monotone; cyclic monotonicity; implementable; dominant strategies; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.3982/ECTA8882

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.

引用

页码：1749 / 1772

页数：24

共 23 条

[1]

ARCHER A, 2008, ACM C EL COMM CHIC I

[2] Frugal Path Mechanisms [J].