Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible claims

被引：140

作者：

Gächter, S

Riedl, A

机构：

[1] Univ Nottingham, CESifo, IZA, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

[2] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

[3] IZA, Tinbergen Inst, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands

[4] Univ Amsterdam, CREED, Fac Econ & Econometr, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2005年 / 51卷 / 02期

关键词：

moral property rights; entitlements; fairness judgments; bargaining with claims; self-serving bias; experiment;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.1040.0311

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

In many business transactions, labor-management relations, international conflicts, and welfare-state reforms, bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible anymore. These entitlements seem to shape negotiation behavior considerably. By using the novel setup of a "bargaining with claims" experiment, we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions, and (dis)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a "moral property right" that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.

引用

页码：249 / 263

页数：15

共 39 条

[1] GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF A BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM FROM THE TALMUD [J].