Sato-crutchfield formulation for some evolutionary games

被引:12
作者
Ahmed, E [1 ]
Hegazi, AS
Elgazzar, AS
机构
[1] Mansoura Univ, Fac Sci, Dept Math, Mansoura 35516, Egypt
[2] United Arab Emirates Univ, Fac Sci, Dept Math, Al Ain, U Arab Emirates
[3] Fac Educ, Dept Math, Al Arish 45111, Egypt
[4] King Saud Univ, Coll Sci, Dept Math, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia
来源
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MODERN PHYSICS C | 2003年 / 14卷 / 07期
关键词
Sato-Crutchfield formulation; evolutionarily stable strategy; evolutionary games; persistence;
D O I
10.1142/S0129183103005091
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
The Sato-Crutchfield equations are analytically and numerically studied. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation corresponds to losing memory. Then the Sato-Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk-dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random, independent of the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.
引用
收藏
页码:963 / 971
页数:9
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