Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence

被引:1280
作者
Schulze, WS
Lubatkin, MH
Dino, RN
Buchholtz, AK
机构
[1] Case Western Reserve Univ, Weatherhead Sch Management, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
[2] Univ Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
[3] Univ Georgia, Terry Coll Business, Dept Management, Athens, GA 30602 USA
关键词
agency theory; altruism; privately-owned firms; family business;
D O I
10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The authors have conducted the kind of research here that we all reach for but too often fail to grasp. I That is, this study of the governance of family firms is theoretically rich and practically relevant. Our colleagues have pressed the limits of agency theory to explore the control of owners' opportunistic behavior, behavior that interestingly just might be rooted in an altruistic impulse. They have done this by empirically examining privately-held, family-managed firms. While such firms embody the dominant form of organization in the world today, they are very underrepresented in our study of organization and management. This research simultaneously advances our understanding of agency theory and draws much needed attention to these kinds of firms. Spend some time with this paper. I think you will be glad that you did.
引用
收藏
页码:99 / 116
页数:18
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