Strategic consequences of historical cost and fair value measurements

被引:19
作者
Reis, Ricardo F. [1 ]
Stocken, Phillip C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Tuck Sch Business, Hanover, NH USA
关键词
edgeworth-bertrand game; endogenous expectations; fair value; historical cost;
D O I
10.1506/0274-9457-GP27-5215
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the measurement of nonfinancial assets in imperfectly competitive markets and considers the effect of alternative measurements on firms' investing and operating activities. We analyze a duopoly where each firm manufactures, reports, and thereafter sells its inventory. We initially characterize the informativeness of a firm's accounting report when it is prepared using historical cost and find that a firm's report does not always reveal its level of inventory. We then characterize the informativeness of a report when it is prepared using fair value and find that it completely reveals a firm's inventory holding. We highlight the difficulty of implementing fair value measurements that arise because fair value is an endogenous consequence of the strategic interaction between firms.
引用
收藏
页码:557 / +
页数:29
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