Punishment and cooperation in nature

被引:192
作者
Raihani, Nichola J. [1 ,2 ]
Thornton, Alex [3 ]
Bshary, Redouan [4 ]
机构
[1] UCL, Dept Genet Evolut & Environm, London WC1E 6BT, England
[2] Zool Soc London, Inst Zool, London NW1 4RY, England
[3] Univ Cambridge, Dept Expt Psychol, Cambridge CB2 EB, England
[4] Univ Neuchatel, Inst Biol, CH-2000 Neuchatel, Switzerland
基金
英国生物技术与生命科学研究理事会; 瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
CLEANER FISH; EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; STRONG RECIPROCITY; SERVICE QUALITY; PARTNER CONTROL; BEHAVIOR; MUTUALISM; MECHANISMS; DEFECTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
Humans use punishment to promote cooperation in laboratory experiments but evidence that punishment plays a similar role in non-human animals is comparatively rare. In this article, we examine why this may be the case by reviewing evidence from both laboratory experiments on humans and ecologically relevant studies on non-human animals. Generally, punishment appears to be most probable if players differ in strength or strategic options. Although these conditions are common in nature, punishment (unlike other forms of aggression) involves immediate payoff reductions to both punisher and target, with net benefits to punishers contingent on cheats behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. In many cases, aggression yielding immediate benefits may suffice to deter cheats and might explain the relative scarcity of punishment in nature.
引用
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页码:288 / 295
页数:8
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