Social setting, intuition and experience in laboratory experiments interact to shape cooperative decision-making

被引:56
作者
Capraro, Valerio [1 ]
Cococcioni, Giorgia [2 ]
机构
[1] Ctr Math & Comp Sci CWI, NL-1098 XG Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] LUISS Guido Carli, Dept Polit Sci, I-00197 Rome, Italy
关键词
cooperation; dual process; learning; SELF-CONTROL DEPLETION; COLLECTIVE ACTION; LOCAL COMMONS; EVOLUTION; PRISONERS; CULTURE; DAMAGE; MODEL; IRRIGATION; PUNISHMENT;
D O I
10.1098/rspb.2015.0237
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Recent studies suggest that cooperative decision-making in one-shot interactions is a history-dependent dynamic process: promoting intuition versus deliberation typically has a positive effect on cooperation (dynamism) among people living in a cooperative setting and with no previous experience in economic games on cooperation (history dependence). Here, we report on a laboratory experiment exploring how these findings transfer to a non-cooperative setting. We find two major results: (i) promoting intuition versus deliberation has no effect on cooperative behaviour among inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting; (ii) experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only under time pressure. These results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an instinctive impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates primarily via the channel of intuition. Our findings shed further light on the cognitive basis of human cooperative decision-making and provide further support for the recently proposed social heuristics hypothesis.
引用
收藏
页数:6
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