A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards

被引:41
作者
Costinot, Arnaud [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Econ, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[2] NBER, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
关键词
product standards; trade agreements; incomplete contracts; National Treatment; Mutual Recognition;
D O I
10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.11.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The WTO and the EU have chosen two different agreements on product standards. While the WTO's approach is primarily based on a "National Treatment" (NT) principle, the EU's approach crucially relies on a principle of "Mutual Recognition" (MR). This paper offers a first look at the comparative performance of these two principles. We show that standards are imposed for levels of externalities that are too low under NT and too high under MR. This suggests that NT should be preferred to MR when the amount of trade in goods characterized by high levels of externalities is large. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:197 / 213
页数:17
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